Selected Papers
1. ‘warranted religion: answering objections to Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology,’ Religious Studies 51 (2015): 477-495.
Abstract: Alvin Plantinga over the decades has developed a particular theory of warrant that would allow certain beliefs to be warranted, even if one lacked propositional arguments or evidence for them. One such belief that Plantinga focuses on is belief in God. There have been, however, numerous objections both to Plantinga's theory of warrant and to the religious application that he makes of it. In this article I address an objection from both of these categories. I first tackle an objection that attempts to show that proper function isn't a necessary condition for warrant. After tackling this, I move on to interact with the Pandora's Box Objection. This objection argues that Plantinga's epistemology is weakened by the fact that all sorts of serious religious beliefs could be warranted by using his system.
2. (with Tyler Taber) ‘Is the Problem of Divine Hiddenness a Problem for the Reformed Epistemologist?,’ The Heythrop Journal 59/5 (2018): 759-866.
Abstract: The problem of divine hiddenness, currently a much-discussed topic in analytic philosophy of religion, can be (roughly) summarized in the question, ‘Why is God not more obvious or apparent?’ Sometimes the problem is used to undermine theistic belief. Here we seek to add a unique contribution to the growing debate on this theme from the perspective of Reformed epistemology, particularly Alvin Plantinga's construal; moreover, we do so in a way that is theologically relevant. We conclude, with assistance from Scripture and from Plantinga, that the problem of divine hiddenness is not a problem for the Reformed epistemologist.
3. (with Erik Baldwin) ‘An epistemic defeater for Islamic Belief?’ International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 76 (2015): 352-367.
Abstract: We aim to further develop and evaluate the prospects of a uniquely Islamic extension of the Standard Aquinas/Calvin model. One obstacle is that certain Qur’anic passages such as Surah 8:43–44 apparently suggest that Muslims have reason to think that Allah might be deceiving them. Consistent with perfect/maximally good being theology, Allah would allow such deceptions only if doing so leads to a greater good, so such passages do not necessarily give Muslims reason to doubt Allah’s goodness. Yet the possibility of deception of the faithful threatens to provide a subjective defeater for the (epistemic) reliability of their cognitive faculties. (‘Even if Allah can be morally good while deceiving, how do you know you aren’t being deceived for a greater good on a more macro level, such as about the nature of the Qur’an?’) Similar in structure to Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN), this defeater threatens to undermine all of a Muslims warrant claims. We consider and evaluate the reply that there are other Qur’anic passages and/or additional conceptual resources in the Islamic tradition that provide grounds for thinking that God’s faithfulness or truthfulness is more centrally and securely embedded in a Muslim’s noetic structure than such doubts. Specifically, we will argue that under certain conditions, there exists a subjective defeater for some Muslims that, unlike McNabb’s approach, isn’t based off of the proper function condition but Plantinga’s truth aimed condition.
4. (with Erik Baldwin) ‘From Theology to Theodicy: A Defense of Felix Culpa,’ in Evil and Some of its Theological Problems, eds. Ben Arbour and John Gilhooly (New Castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing).
5. (with Erik Baldwin) ‘Reformed Epistemology and the Pandora’s Box Objection: The Vaisesika and Mormon Traditions,’ Philosophia Christi 18/2 (2016): 451-465.
Abstract: Furthering our project of applying Plantinga’s epistemology to different world religions, we do a comparative study of Mormonism and Vaiśeṣika Hinduism and analyze whether they can utilize Plantinga’s epistemology in order to claim that their beliefs about God if true are probably warranted. Specifically, we argue that they cannot, as ultimately they are unable to account for the preconditions needed to make for an intelligible cognitive design plan, due to either affirming an infinite regress when it comes to the designers of our cognitive faculties or affirming an infinite number of cosmological cycles in which our faculties are formed.
6. (with Erik Baldwin) Divine Methodology: A Lawful Deflection of Kantian and Kantian-esque Defeaters
Abstract: Immanuel Kant argues that though Divine revelation is ontologically possible, given phenomenal level constraints on our cognitive faculties, it isn’t epistemically possible for us to know or to recognize Divine revelation on the noumenal level of reality. We call this Kant’s Epistemological Objection Against Divine Revelation (EOADR). Contra Kant, in this paper, we argue that the EOADR doesn’t undermine the Reformed tradition’s view of Divine revelation because it has resources that make knowledge of Divine revelation intelligible. The primary way of establishing our argument is by articulating and furthering Alvin Plantinga’s religious epistemology. After doing this, we tackle two objections to our approach that are in the family of Kant‘s objection, namely Stephen Law‘s X-Argument Against Religious Belief and Erik Baldwin‘s Multiple Viable Extensions Objection. Similar to Kant‘s argument, these arguments attempt to show, that the Reformed epistemologist is in danger of acquiring an undercutting defeater for trusting her religious belief. We respond to each in turn.
7. 'Super Mario Strikes Back: A Molinist Reply to Welty’s Gunslingers,' Perichoresis 16/2 (2018): 45-53.
Abstract: Molinists generally see Calvinism as possessing certain liabilities from which Molinism is immune. For example, Molinists have traditionally rejected Calvinism, in part, because it allegedly makes God the author of sin. According to Molina, we ‘should not infer that He is in any way a cause of sin.’ However, Greg Welty has recently argued by way of his Gunslingers Argument that, when it comes to God’s relationship to evil, Molinism is susceptible to the same liabilities as Calvinism. If his argument is successful, he has undercut, at least partially, justification for believing in Molinism. While I concede that Welty’s argument is successful in that it does undercut some justification for believing in Molinism, this concession does not entail that, as it relates to the problem of evil, the Calvinist and the Molinist are in the same epistemic position. In this article, I argue that, when it comes to God’s relationship to evil, the Molinist is in a superior epistemic situation to the Calvinist. I do this in two steps. First, I argue for what I call the Robust Felix Culpa Theodicy. Second, I argue that the Robust Felix Culpa Theodicy is incompatible with Calvinism.
8. ‘Proper Functionalism and the Metalevel: A Friendly Reply to Timothy and Lydia McGrew,’ Quaestiones Disputatae 8/2 (2018): 155-164.
9. 'By Whose Authority?: A Political Argument for God's Existence,' European Journal of Philosophy of Religion 111/2 (2019): 163-204.
In The Problem of Political Authority, Michael Huemer argues that the contractarian and consequentialist groundings of political authority are unsuccessful, and, in fact, that there are no adequate contemporary accounts of political authority. As such, the modern state is illegitimate and we have reasons to affirm political anarchism. We disagree with Huemer’s conclusion. But we consider Huemer’s critiques of contractarianism and consequentialism to be compelling. Here we will juxtapose, alongside Huemer’s critiques, a theistic account of political authority from Nicholas Wolterstorff’s book The Mighty and the Almighty. We think that Wolterstorff’s model does better than contractarianism and consequentialism at answering Huemer’s critiques. We also think that an abductive basis for God’s existence emerges from the inadequate authority accounts that Huemer surveys.
9. (with Jeremy Neill) 'By Whose Authority?: A Political Argument for God's Existence,' European Journal of Philosophy of Religion 111/2 (2019): 163-204.
In The Problem of Political Authority, Michael Huemer argues that the contractarian and consequentialist groundings of political authority are unsuccessful, and, in fact, that there are no adequate contemporary accounts of political authority. As such, the modern state is illegitimate and we have reasons to affirm political anarchism. We disagree with Huemer’s conclusion. But we consider Huemer’s critiques of contractarianism and consequentialism to be compelling. Here we will juxtapose, alongside Huemer’s critiques, a theistic account of political authority from Nicholas Wolterstorff’s book The Mighty and the Almighty. We think that Wolterstorff’s model does better than contractarianism and consequentialism at answering Huemer’s critiques. We also think that an abductive basis for God’s existence emerges from the inadequate authority accounts that Huemer surveys.
10. 'Wiley Coyote and the Craggy Rocks Below: The Perils of Godless Ethics,' Philosophia Christi 20/2 (2018): 339-346.
William Lane Craig has defended the following two contentions: (1) If theism is true, we have a sound foundation for morality, and, (2) If theism is false, we do not have a sound foundation for morality. Erik Wielenberg rejects (2). Specifically, Wielenberg argues that naturalists have resources to make sense of objective moral values, moral duties, and moral knowledge. In response to Wielenberg, I defend Craig’s second contention by arguing that Wielenberg’s theory fails to robustly capture our moral phenomenology as well as make intelligible robust moral knowledge.
11. 2020 With Joseph Blado, ‘Mary and Fátima: A Modest C-Inductive Argument for Catholicism,’ Perichoresis 18/5: 55-65.
12. With Joseph Blado, “Confucianism and the Liturgy: An Analectical Argument for the High Church Traditions,” forthcoming in TheoLogica.
12. 2019 With Joseph Blado, “Confucianism and the Liturgy: An Analectical Argument for the High Church Traditions,” in TheoLogica
13. 2021 With Erik Baldwin, ‘Religious Epistemology in Analytic Theology,’ in T&T Clark Companion to Analytic Theology (London: Bloomsbury, 2021), 35-44
14. 2020 ‘Pestilent Popes or a Pestilent Church,’ The Heythrop Journal 61/4: 671-676
15. 2020 With Michael DeVito, ‘Has Oppy Done Away with the Aristotelian Proof?’ The Heythrop Journal 61/5: 723-731
In this essay, we engage with Graham Oppy’s work on Thomas Aquinas’s First Way. We argue that Oppy’s objections shouldn’t be seen as successful. In order to establish this thesis, we first analyze Oppy’s exegesis of Aquinas’s First Way, as well as the counter‐arguments he puts forth (including the charge that Aquinas’s argument is invalid or, if deemed valid, forces one to adopt determinism). Next, we address Oppy’s handling of the contemporary scholarship covering the First Way. Specifically, we lay out Edward Feser’s most recent formulation of the argument and analyze Oppy’s main objection to it.
16. (With Chad McIntosh) ‘Houston Do We Have a Problem? Extraterrestrial Intelligent Life and Christian Belief,’ Philosophia Christi, forthcoming
Would the existence of extraterrestrial intelligent life (ETI) conflict in any way with Christian belief? We identify six areas of potential conflict. If there be no conflict in any of these areas—and we argue ultimately there is not—we are confident in declaring that there is no conflict, period. This conclusion underwrites the integrity of theological explorations into the existence of ETI, which has become a topic of increasing interest among theologians in recent years.
17. (With Michael DeVito) ‘Divine foreknowledge and human free will: Embracing the Paradox, International,’ Journal for Philosophy of Religion (2021), doi.org/10.1007/s11153-021-09791-1
A family of objections to theism aims to show that certain key theological doctrines, when held in conjunction, are incompatible. The longstanding problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom represents one such objection. In this essay, we provide the theist an epistemic approach to the problem that allows for the rational affirmation of both divine foreknowledge and human freedom despite their prima facie incompatibility. Specifically, we apply James Anderson’s Rational Affirmation of Paradox Theology model to the problem, arguing that the theist can stave off defeat that arises from a belief in the conjunction of both doctrines by appealing to paradox. In order to establish this thesis, we first define key terms as well as lay out the theological fatalist argument. Next, we explicate Anderson’s model and apply it to the foreknowledge and freedom problem. We conclude by addressing the objection that an appeal to paradox is simply special pleading for the theist, arguing that the naturalist can be found in a similar epistemic position.
18. (With Michael DeVito) ‘Basic Beliefs, The Embryo Rescue Case, and Single-Issue Voting: A Response to Dustin Crummett,’ National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, forthcoming
In this essay, we respond to Dustin Crummett’s argument that one cannot consistently appeal to body count reasoning to justify being a single-issue pro-life voter if one is also committed to the usual response to the embryo rescue case. Specifically, we argue that a modified version of BSR we call BSR* is consistent with the usual response. We then move to address concerns about the relevance of BSR* to Crummett’s original thesis.
19. Forthcoming with Michael DeVito, ‘The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism: A Wittgenstenian Response,’ forthcoming in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
20. Forthcoming with Michael DeVito, ‘Climate Alarmism or Lukewarming: How so called American Conservatives Should Think About Climate Change,’ Ethics and the Environment.
21. Forthcoming with Michael DeVito, ‘Foreknowledge & Divine Emotions: A Further Exploration into the Emotional Life of a Passible God,’ European Journal of Philosophy of Religion.
22. 2021 With Michael DeVito, ‘Cognitive Science of Religion and Classical Theism: A Synthesis,’ Religions, 13, 24: https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13010024.
23. Forthcoming with Michael DeVito, ‘Ockham on the Side of the Angels': Why a Classical Theist Shouldn’t be Moved by Oppy’s Argument from Simplicity,’ The New Blackfriars.
24. Forthcoming with Erik Baldwin, ‘Searching for the Ineffable: Classical Theism and Eastern Thought About God,’ in Classical Theism: New Essays on the Metaphysics of God, eds. Robert Koons and Jonathan Fuqua (Routledge Press)
25. 2022 With Michael DeVito, ‘A Christology of Religions and a Theology of Evangelism,’ Religions 13
27. Forthcoming, ‘The Aristotelian Proof Revisited: A Reflection,’ New Blackfriars.
28. 2023 With Michael DeVito, ‘Warranted Eastern Christian Belief: Extending Plantinga’s Extended Model,’ in Eastern Christian Approaches for Philosophy, eds. Joshua Brown and J. Simens (London: Palgrave, 2022).
29. 2023 ‘Against the Access Requirement: A Plantingian Response to Public Reason Accessibilism,’ in Palgrave Handbook to Religion and State, ed. Shannon Holzer (Palgrave).
30. Forthcoming (With Alexander Pruss), ‘What Animals Might there be in Heaven?’ American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly.
31. Forthcoming, (Erik Baldwin), ‘The Stigmata, Rainbow Bodies, and Hume’s Argument Against Miracles,’ Journal of the Philosophy and Religion Society of Thailand.
32. Forthcoming, (Gregory Stacey), ‘Sola Scriptura and the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism,’ Theologica.
33. Forthcoming, (Chad McIntosh), Houston, Naturalists Have a Problem: ETI and Evidence for Theism, in Space, Philosophy, Ethics, ed. Bill Anderson (Vernon Press).